



**FINDINGS REPORT FOR THE GANDYR FOUNDATION:
Democratic Ideals and Political Behavior:
Young Israelis in Comparative Perspective***

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Principal Investigator:

Dr. Jennifer Oser, Lecturer (U.S. Assistant Professor)

Department of Politics and Government

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Building 72, 6th floor, Room 669

Beer Sheva, Israel 8410501

Telephone: 058-441-3908

Faculty website:

http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/politics/Pages/staff/jennifer_oser.aspx

Email: oser@post.bgu.ac.il

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* **NOTE:** This is a public findings report that is part of an ongoing cross-national research project on citizenship values and political participation in contemporary democracies. Before citing this report, please contact the author for the current version of this work in progress. Critical input on the report is welcome, and despite the acknowledgments above, the usual caveat applies that all remaining errors are the author's sole responsibility.

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1. Scientific background

A vibrant debate is taking place about the changing democratic values and behavior of young people in contemporary democracies. To counter decades of concern about the ‘crisis of democracy’ due to citizens’ disengagement from democratic life (Crozier et al. 1975), a growing wave of research emphasizes the emergence of a new, engaged form of citizenship norms and behavior, particularly among young people (Dalton 2008; Dalton & Welzel, 2014; Norris 2002). Although recent research has confirmed that new, engaged citizenship norms are increasing over time in contemporary democracies (Oser & Hooghe 2013; Hooghe & Oser), little is known about how these changing values impact on the actual political behavior of young people. We do know, however, that good citizenship norms are highly stratified (Hooghe, Oser & Marien 2016), as citizens with high socio-economic status are more likely to support engaged citizenship norms.

Research indicates that Israel is experiencing political processes similar to other advanced democracies, including trends in democratic values and patterns of political participation (e.g., Hermann 2012; Herman et al. 2015; Oser 2010; Oser & Galnoor 2016; Wolfsfeld et al. 2016). In light of the increased availability of high-quality cross-national data since the first comprehensive study of Israeli participation patterns in cross-national perspective (Wolfsfeld 1988), it is possible to contribute to empirical research that focuses on these dynamics in comparison to other contemporary democracies.

The lack of recent research on Israeli democratic values and political behavior is a concern for those who care about the strength of active citizenship in Israel. In addition, the unique features of Israel’s highly diverse society make it a useful test case for studying the relationship between democratic values and political behavior, particularly among young adults. This findings report contributes to current research by taking advantage of available data to investigate the relationship between democratic values and political behavior in Israel in cross-national comparative perspective, and with a particular focus on young adults (18-30 years old).

Project Aims and Research Questions

This report contributes new empirical research about the democratic ideals and political behavior of young adults in Israeli society. In addition, the report aims to identify practical implications of the study’s findings for practitioners who wish to increase active citizenship among young Israelis. In order to achieve these aims, the report investigates three main research questions.

First, what are the democratic ideals of young adults in Israeli society? This research question is important from both theoretical and practical perspectives, since prior to investigating young adults’ (dis)engagement as citizens in contemporary democracy, we must first understand what they see as most important for ideal democratic functioning. A series of studies that investigate 30 advanced democracies—including Israel—has shown that some citizens uniquely emphasize only social citizenship elements of democracy (e.g. decreasing social-economic gaps and minority rights), while other citizens uniquely emphasize the importance of formal political rights (e.g. the rule of law and the

competitiveness of electoral systems) (Hooghe, Marien & Oser, 2016; Hooghe & Oser 2016b; Oser & Hooghe 2016a, 2016b).

While these prior studies attained new theoretical insights regarding democratic ideals in contemporary democracies in general, the unique characteristics of young citizens in Israel in comparison to other countries have not yet received sustained scholarly attention.

The second key research question is to determine the patterns of the political behavior of young adults (ages 18-30) in Israel in comparison to other age groups. While prior research has indicated that young age groups are not as involved in electoral-oriented participation as their older counterparts (Dalton 2008; Wattenberg 2012), recent studies have shown a trend of young people's involvement in a variety of political activities outside of the electoral arena, such as political consumerism, protest behavior, and internet activism (Gibson & Cantijoch 2013; Oser 2016; Oser, Hooghe & Marien 2013; Stolle & Micheletti 2013; Theocharis 2015). This topic has received considerable attention in the research literature in general and some research of these dynamics has focused on Israel in particular (e.g., Samuel-Azran et al. 2015; Wolfsfeld et al. 2016).

The third key research question is a natural extension of the first two questions: how do young people's democratic ideals relate to and impact upon their political behavior as (in)active citizens? It is possible, for example, that some citizens may choose to be politically disengaged out of reasons of principle, and not due to disappointment or alienation from the political system. This question has received considerable attention in the research literature, but requires further empirical analysis. The Israeli case provides an important laboratory for investigating this research question because of the diversity of the country's citizens (e.g. Arab/Palestinian citizens of Israel, ultra-orthodox Jews, immigrant populations) in terms of socio-demographic backgrounds, as well as differing values structures.

Data and Research Method

High-quality and cross-nationally reliable data are available to explore all three of these research questions through the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted in 2012 (ESS Round 6, 2012, 2016). Israel is included in most survey waves of the ESS, including in the unique 2012 module that investigates citizens' democratic ideals. Data collection for the ESS in Israel is conducted by the B.I. Cohen Institute using advanced academic standards for quality survey techniques, including interviews conducted in three languages: Hebrew, Arabic and Russian.

Despite the availability of these data, there is a lack of high quality and high visibility research that analyzes these data with a focus on democratic values and political behavior in Israel. In cross-national research, Israel is sometimes omitted from cross-national analyses despite the availability of the data, since it can be seen as an "outlier" in the study of European societies (e.g. Norris & Davis 2007). Israel is often analyzed as one country among many in order to test broader theoretical questions (e.g., Hooghe, Marien & Oser 2016; Oser & Hooghe 2016b), but further research is possible to better understand Israel-specific data and processes, including focused comparison of Israeli society to other

advanced democracies. The ESS is widely recognized as one of the highest quality surveys in the field which includes young people starting at age 15 (Jowell et al. 2007), and the Israeli survey design oversamples minority populations, including Arab/Palestinian citizens of Israel, in order to enable the analysis of diverse segments of Israeli society.

The research method for this project builds upon prior research experience with similar data (e.g., Oser 2016; Oser Leighley & Winneg 2014). The data regarding democratic values is analyzed using latent class analysis (LCA), an analytical technique that is not yet widely used in political science, but is well-known in social science research in general when the theoretical interest is to identify groups of people with a similar combination of patterns, such as biomedical researchers' interest in patterns of 'symptoms' to reach medical diagnoses (Collins & Lanza 2010; Magidson & Vermunt 2004). A new methodological innovation in this field of research is implemented to conduct 'measurement equivalence' testing across groups (e.g. "countries" in this study), in order to determine the degree of similarity of the identified latent classes across countries, including Israel (Kankaras & Vermunt 2014).

For the current study, LCA is used to identify groups of citizens who share a similar combination of emphases about their conceptions of what constitutes an ideal democracy. The identified democratic ideals are then analyzed in terms of the associated political behaviors. In collaborative studies we have identified that two main democratic value groups include those who value social citizenship rights versus a separate group of citizens who highly value political rights (Hooghe, Marien & Oser 2016; Hooghe & Oser 2016b; Oser & Hooghe 2016a). In addition, we have begun to investigate how these different democratic values are related to citizens' actual political engagement as active citizens (Oser & Hooghe 2016b). The methodology used in the current study aims to answer this question for Israel in comparison to other countries, with a specific focus on the values and behavior of young adults (age 18-30) in comparison to other age groups.

Intended relevance of the research

This study is intended to be relevant or scholars and for practitioners. For scholars, the relationship between democratic values and political behavior is a critical field of inquiry, and the unique laboratory of Israel's diverse society combined with state-of-the-art analytical techniques enable new insights into the three research questions that motivate this study.

For practitioners, there is little doubt that one of the most important questions facing Israeli democracy is the encouragement of engaged citizenship among young age groups from all sectors of Israeli society. Extreme conflicts of values and behavior in Israel are increasingly showcased in the Israeli media, despite a lack of high-level research to carefully investigate these phenomena. In order to support practitioners' efforts to enhance active citizenship from all sectors of Israeli society, this report aims to contribute to a clear-eyed empirical picture of contemporary democratic values and behaviors.

The key findings of the research are summarized in the concluding section with both scholars and practitioners as intended audiences.

2. Findings section I: Democratic ideals

As noted, the data analyzed in this report is from the European Social Survey conducted in 2012 in 29 countries, including Israel (ESS Round 6, 2012; 2016). This round of the ESS survey includes a unique survey module conducted for the first time that asks citizens what they think is most important for democracy, and the book written by the designers of this special module reviews a first round of new insights that have resulted from these data (Ferrin & Kriesi 2016).

The module about democratic ideals begins with the prefatory question: “How important do you think it is for democracy in general that...”, and subsequent responses are coded on a scale from 0 (not important at all) to 10 (extremely important).

The elements of democracy that are included in the question incorporate an unusually comprehensive set of indicators on the subject to date. The subsequent data can be used to assess respondents' overall level of expectations (high or low), as well as whether respondents consistently emphasize certain types of elements of democracy as most important. The following table summarizes the mean scores for all 29 countries in the data, including Israel, with the indicators ordered beginning with the indicators ranked as most important on average.

Table. “Democratic ideals”: Mean scores for 29 European countries in 2012

Description	Abbreviation	ESS average
1. The courts treat everyone the same	courts fair	9.23
2. The government explains its decisions to voters	govt expl.	8.88
3. National elections are free and fair	fair elec.	8.86
4. The media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the govt.	media info.	8.74
5. The government protects all citizens against poverty	poverty	8.73
6. Governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job	party acc.	8.47
7. The rights of minority groups are protected	minority	8.26
8. The government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels	income eq.	8.25
9. Opposition parties are free to criticise the government	opposition	8.20
10. The media are free to criticise the government	free media	8.08
11. Different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another	party alter.	7.95

Notes: Source: European Social Survey 2012; n=48,805 for 29 countries. Appropriate weights applied in ESS6 version 2.2: population size weights and post-stratification weights (pspwght*pweight). Prefatory survey question: “Using this card, please tell me how important you think it is for democracy in general that...”. Responses coded on a 0 to 10 scale where 0 indicates “not at all important” and 10 indicates “extremely important”.

Democratic ideals in 29 countries: Mean scores and interpretation

A few summary observations stand out from reviewing the previous table. First, all of the items are rated relatively high on the scale from zero to ten, with the least important item scoring a 7.95 average. Using traditional analytical techniques, these findings are perhaps somewhat disappointing in the sense that the data are not particularly informative. One could conclude that in general, people think that all of these items are very or extremely important.

A second summary observation is that from a theoretical perspective regarding the different elements of democracy, the data show that diverse elements of democracy are considered important. This observation becomes apparent upon reviewing the theoretical framework advanced in the classic work of T.H. Marshall (1950, 1963) on the historical progression of different types of citizenship rights as summarized in the following table. Marshall discussed the development over time in advanced democracies of distinctive types of rights for citizens, beginning with civil rights in the 18th century, political rights in the 19th century, and continuing to social rights in the 20th century. As the table notes, each type of citizenship right in this theoretical framework corresponds to specific elements of democracy.

Table. T.H. Marshall's citizenship rights theoretical framework, historical progression

Type of citizenship right	When?	Examples of rights
(1) Civil rights	18 th century	*Freedom of thought *Right to own property
(2) Political rights	19th and early 20th century	*Free and fair elections *Free media
(3) Social rights	20th century	*Protection from poverty *Government reduction of inequality

Notes: for additional explanation of T.H. Marshall's theoretical framework as it pertains to the current research see Hooghe & Oser (2016b).

Democratic ideals: Identifying types of citizenship rights

An integration of the information from the previous two tables informs the following table which highlights different types of citizenship rights in color. A glance at the table clarifies that people surveyed in the 29 countries in the ESS 2012 survey did not all believe that the "political rights" elements (in blue) consistently the most important, nor that the "social right" (in red) are consistently the most important. Rather, the table clarifies that both of these types of citizenship rights are considered important on average, according to the respondents in 29 countries.

Table. Highlighting “political rights” and “social rights” indicator means, 29 countries
Integration of prior 2 tables

Blue = “political rights” **Red=“social rights”**

Description	Abbreviation	Mean
Courts are fair	courts fair	9.23
Govt explains decisions	govt expl.	8.88
Elections are fair	fair elec.	8.86
Media reliable	media info.	8.74
Govt protects citizens poverty	poverty	8.73
Governing parties accountable	party acc.	8.47
Minority rights protected	minority	8.26
Govt reduces income inequality	income eq.	8.25
Opposition parties free to critique	opposition	8.20
Media free to critique	free media	8.08
Parties offer clear alternatives	party alter.	7.95

Source: ESS 2012; n=48,805 for 29 countries.

Appropriate weights applied in ESS6 version 2.2 (pspweight*pweight).


Notes: items in black include "civil rights" items, as well as items that could arguably be categorized as more than one type of citizenship right.

Democratic ideals: Five distinct ideals identified in 29 countries

Although the overall ranking of the importance of these elements of democracy is informative, we are also interested to know how individual people combine their ranking of these separate indicators into a holistic conception of ideal democracy. It is possible to imagine that in general, some individuals may answer that all items are important to them – or alternatively, that none of the items are important to them. Keeping in mind the different types of citizenship rights in Marshall's theoretical framework, another possibility is that some people may emphasize certain types of democratic rights as most important to them (e.g. social rights) at the same time that they de-emphasize the importance of another type of democratic rights (e.g. political rights).

The following figure presents findings of latent class analyses that identify groups of people with distinctly different democratic ideals in terms of the elements of democracy that they consider as most important (Hooghe, Marien & Oser 2016). The figure shows that three of the groups ("high", "medium" and "low") include people who consider all of the items reviewed in the survey as important at generally the same level. The other two groups include people who place distinctive emphases on the importance of certain types of citizenship rights, namely the "social" rights group (in red), and the "political" rights group (in blue). Since the elements of democracy are listed from left to right in the order of highest to lowest means in the overall population, the criss-crossing of the red and blue lines highlights that people who belong to these groups place emphasis on particular elements of democracy (e.g., social or political) and do not simply consider all elements of democracy to be equally important.

Figure. Democratic ideals held by five groups of citizens in 29 countries



Notes: See Hooghe, Marien and Oser (2016) for further description of data and analysis. Source: European Social Survey, 2012 (n=54,673); y-axis measures conditional probabilities that the indicator is important for democracy. Findings based on 3-point coding of the original 11-category democratic ideal items: 0-7 recoded as 1; 8-9 recoded as 2; 10 recoded as 3. Latent class analysis conditional probabilities are for optimal partial equivalence model that includes country covariate and applies design weights.

Democratic ideals in Israel: Mean scores compared to 28-country mean

How does Israel compare to the other 28 countries in the ESS 2012 regarding these democratic ideals? The following table displays the mean values in 28 countries compared to Israel, ordered from highest to lowest in terms of the 28-country mean value.

A few observations emerge from these findings. First, it is clear that Israel is similar to the 28 country average in that there is little variance in the mean ranking of importance of the Israeli public for these different elements of democracy, with the lowest ranked item in Israel also at an approximate value of eight. Differences are apparent, however, in the rank order of the Israeli means, as indicated in the right hand column. While "fair courts" are ranked as the most important issue for both the 28-country sample and for the Israeli sample, the table shows that "the government responsibility for explaining its decision" is ranked the second most important item in the 28 country sample, whereas it is the 8th ranked item in the Israeli sample.

To summarize the items for which the ranking differs meaningfully for the 28-country versus the Israel sample, two social rights items are of higher importance to Israelis, namely that the government protects citizens from poverty (ranked 3rd by Israelis), and that the government reduces income inequality (ranked 4th). In addition, two political rights items receive a lower ranking from Israelis, namely that the government explains its decisions (ranked 8th by Israelis) and that governing parties should be held accountable (ranked 11th by Israelis).


Table. "Democratic ideals": Means for 28 European countries and Israel in 2012, all ages

Description	Abbreviation	28 ESS countries	Israel	Israel order
1. Courts are fair	courts fair	9.26	9.46	1
2. Government explains decisions	govt expl.	8.91	8.61	8
3. Elections are fair	fair elec.	8.89	9.34	2
4. Media reliable	media info.	8.77	8.94	5
5. Government protects citizens from poverty	poverty	8.76	9.08	3
6. Governing parties accountable	party acc.	8.51	7.96	11
7. Minority rights protected	minority	8.30	8.62	7
8. Govt reduces income inequality	income eq.	8.28	8.98	4
9. Opposition parties free to critique	opposition	8.23	8.68	6
10. Media free to critique	free media	8.11	8.48	9
11. Parties offer clear alternatives	party alter.	7.99	8.04	10

Notes: ESS 2012; n=46,652 for 28 ESS countries; 2,153 for Israel. Appropriate weights applied in ESS6 version 2.2 (pspwght*pweight). Bolded entries: indicators for which Israel differs from 28-country average by 2 or more rank orders.

Democratic ideals in Israel: Mean scores compared to 28-country mean (cont'd)

The following figure presents the same data in a bar graph format, along with confidence intervals in whisker plots for each item to ease of statistical significance. For both the Israeli and 28-country data, the figure shows that the differences in means between the 28-country and Israeli data are statistically significant. Only for one item – the far right-hand indicator of whether parties offer clear alternatives to each other – are rated at the same average level of importance in the 28-country and Israeli sample when standard error is taken into account.



Notes: ESS 2012; n=46,652 for 28 ESS countries; 2,153 for Israel. Appropriate weights applied in ESS6 version 2.2 (pspwght*pweight).

Democratic ideals of young adults: Mean scores in Israel compared to 28-country mean

How do democratic ideals in Israel compare to the other 28 countries in the data when young adults are analyzed separately? The following table shows a comparison of mean values for 28-countries and Israel for the whole data sample, as well as for the 18-30 year old age group only. First, it is clear that for the 28-country sample there is little deviation in rank order of importance for the 18-30 year olds compared to the overall sample. This is true also for Israel: a glance at the items in bold that represent the indicators for which the general population in Israel differs from the 28-country rank order shows that the young adult ranking of these items is generally similar to the rank order of the all-age sample.

Table. “Democratic ideals”: Means for 28 European countries and Israel in 2012, 18-30 year olds


Description	Abbreviation	All ages			18-30 year olds only			
		28 ESS mean	Israel mean	Israel order	28 ESS mean	28 ESS order	Israel mean	Israel order
1. Courts are fair	courts fair	9.26	9.46	1	9.12	1	9.17	1
2. Government explains decisions	govt expl.	8.91	8.61	8	8.71	3	8.27	8
3. Elections are fair	fair elec.	8.89	9.34	2	8.73	2	9.02	2
4. Media reliable	media info.	8.77	8.94	5	8.65	4	8.67	4
5. Govt protects from poverty	poverty	8.76	9.08	3	8.51	5	8.71	3
6. Governing parties accountable	party acc.	8.51	7.96	11	8.13	7	7.22	11
7. Minority rights protected	minority	8.30	8.62	7	8.15	6	8.52	6
8. Govt reduces income inequality	income eq.	8.28	8.98	4	8.00	9	8.54	5
9. Opposition parties free to critique	opposition	8.23	8.68	6	8.03	8	8.41	7
10. Media free to critique	free media	8.11	8.48	9	7.92	10	8.12	9
11. Parties offer clear alternatives	party alter.	7.99	8.04	10	7.84	11	7.99	10

Source: ESS 2012. For all ages, n=46,652 for 28 ESS countries; 2,153 for Israel. For 18-30 year olds, n=8261 for 28 ESS countries; 539 for Israel. Appropriate weights applied in ESS6 version 2.2 (pspwght*pweight). Bolded entries: indicators for which Israel differs from 28-country average rank orders.

Democratic ideals of young adults: Mean scores in Israel vs. 28-country mean (cont'd)

The following figure displays the same data in the prior table in bar chart form. As noted in the summary of the prior table, the trends are generally similar for 18-30 year olds compared to the whole sample. A "globalization" phenomenon is somewhat evident in that for the 18-30 year old age group in that for young adults, two additional indicators have the same mean scores for the European and Israeli samples (namely "courts fair" and "media informative"), whereas for the sample that includes all age groups Israel scored higher on these items.

Another observation that emerges from comparing the previous bar chart of the whole age sample to the following bar chart of the 18-30 year old sample only is that there are no indicators for which the Israel vs. 28-country comparison shifts direction for the young adults compared to the whole sample: the items that are more important for Israelis than for Europeans among the whole population are also more important to Israeli young adults in comparison to European young adults. The only item for which the gap between the level of importance changes noticeably between young adults and the whole sample is "holding government parties accountable", followed by the indicator for the "government explaining its position". Further research would be needed to determine why this gap exists, though a possible interpretation of these findings is that young Israelis believe less in the government parties and the government, and therefore rank these elements as less important overall.




Democratic ideals of five groups of citizens: 29-country group size, including Israel

The following figure has already been presented and discussed above with an emphasis on the substantive interpretation of the different types of democratic ideals. As reviewed in detail in other research (Hooghe, Marien & Oser 2016), advanced statistical techniques show that all 29 countries in the sample – including Israel – are determined to be characterized by measurement equivalence, meaning that five types of democratic ideals are valid and comparable across all of these countries.

The legend of the figure also provides information regarding the proportion of people who belong to each of these groups in the 29-country sample. The largest is the “medium” group, which includes 31% of the population. This means that close to a third of all of those interviewed in the survey responded that all of the items are important at a similar, medium level. The next largest group, “high”, includes 24% of the population. The “social” rights and “political” rights groups are of fairly similar size, with 20% and 16% of the overall population, respectively. Finally, the “low” group is relatively small, with only 10% of the sample belonging to this group.

Figure. Democratic ideals held by five groups of citizens in 29 countries



Notes: See Hooghe, Marien and Oser (2016) for further description of data and analysis. Source: European Social Survey, 2012 (n=54,673); y-axis measures conditional probabilities that the indicator is important for democracy. Findings based on 3-point coding of the original 11-category democratic ideal items: 0-7 recoded as 1; 8-9 recoded as 2; 10 recoded as 3. Latent class analysis conditional probabilities are for optimal partial equivalence model that includes country covariate and applies design weights.

Democratic ideals of five groups of citizens: Age in Israel and Europe

Building upon the previous figure, the table below shows the breakdown by age group for each of these democratic ideals, first in the whole 29 country sample, and then in Israel only. The entries in the table represent the proportion of each age group that belong to each of the five democratic ideals groups. For example, for the 18-30 year old age group, the table shows that a somewhat larger proportion of the 18-30 year old age group (11.12%) belongs to the “low” group in comparison to the population as a whole (9.8%). For the 29 country sample, the difference is not substantively large, however, and the other distinctions that are evident for the 18-30 year old group in the 29-country sample is that they have a somewhat larger group of “medium”, and somewhat lower group of “high”. This finding could be explained by two different theories: younger age groups may be more critical in their democratic values in comparison to older age cohorts (Norris 1999, 2011); or, alternatively, younger age groups may be more likely to simply choose a “middle” pattern of response due to their lack of clearly defined attitudes in comparison to older age cohorts (van Deth et al 2011; Zaller 1992).

In general, though, we see that for the 29-country sample, the young adult age group of 18-30 year olds are fairly similar to the overall population. This is true even for the “political” and “social” groups, which defies two expectations from the literature. It could be argued that young adults may systematically lean “left” on the left-right political continuum and therefore prefer the “social” ideal, which is not the case for the young adults (although this table shows that this descriptive characterizes the 15-17 year old age group). Alternatively, it could be argued that young adults may not have as clearly defined conceptions of democratic ideals as older age cohorts, and therefore may not ascribe to these more complex democratic ideals that emphasize the importance of certain types of citizenship rights (e.g. social) while simultaneously de-emphasizing others (e.g. political).

Table: Democratic ideal distribution by age group – 29 countries

29 COUNTRIES						
Age range	Low	Medium	High	Political	Social	n
15-17	14.07	40.53	13.87	11.27	20.27	1500
18-30	11.12	33.60	19.93	16.35	18.99	9288
31-45	8.96	29.88	23.36	18.79	19.02	12685
46-65	8.50	27.89	27.12	16.21	20.28	17784
66-103	11.24	30.84	24.77	12.52	20.63	10358
Total	9.8	30.37	24.05	15.98	19.81	51615

Democratic ideals of five groups of citizens: Age in Israel and Europe (cont'd)

The following table displays the same findings for the Israeli sample only. Before investigating the age breakdown, we must compare the “total” row for the 29-country and Israel samples that shows the size each group in the overall population. The tables on the previous and current page show that the “high”, “social” and “political” groups are similar in size for the Israeli and 29-country sample. There is somewhat of a difference between Israel and the 29-country sample, however, in that in Israel the “medium” group is somewhat larger, and the “low” group is somewhat smaller. Concentrating on the “low” group size, this could be interpreted as a positive finding for Israeli democracy as a whole in that a smaller group of Israeli citizens have low expectations for Israeli democracy in comparison to the other 28 countries in the study – only 5.73% of the Israeli population belong to this group, whereas the 29-country proportion for this group is 9.8%.

When we focus on the 18-30 year olds in Israel in comparison to other Israeli age groups, the findings are generally similar to the 29-country findings in the previous table. For example, for the 18-30 year olds, the political and social groups are similar to the 29 country mean. The Israeli 18-30 year old sample is similar to the 29-country patterns for this age group in that the “medium” group is relatively large, and the “high” group is relatively small.

One finding stands out for the age comparison of the Israeli sample, however: the 18-30 year old age group has a sizeable proportion of “low” ideals (11.57%) in comparison to all other age groups, and is more than twice as large as the next largest age group in this regard. When we compare the size of the 18-30 year old “low” group to the 29-country sample in the prior table, Israel does not differ from the 29-country findings. What is important to note for Israeli political dynamics, however, is that within Israel the group of people who report having “low” expectations and ideals about democracy are disproportionately made up of Israeli young adults. This finding highlights the importance of understanding other characteristics of this low-expectation 18-30 year old group to learn more about the implications of this finding for the functioning of Israeli democracy, and this is explored further in the following pages.

Table: Democratic ideal distribution by age group – Israel only

ISRAEL						
Age range	Low	Medium	High	Political	Social	n
15-17	5.31	36.28	14.16	20.35	23.89	113
18-30	11.57	38.00	16.23	17.10	17.10	579
31-45	3.47	37.09	22.70	18.37	18.37	577
46-65	2.93	30.16	29.43	13.91	23.57	683
66-103	5.44	33.68	26.68	15.28	18.91	386
Total	5.73	34.69	23.31	16.34	19.93	2338

Note: Entries are the proportion of each age group that belong to each of the five democratic ideals groups (row total = 100%).

Democratic ideals: Comparisons of all 29 countries

The findings presented to this point include results based on pooling the data from all 29 countries together, as well as comparing the single-country findings of Israel to the pooled data of the other 28 countries in the sample. We also aim to better understand how Israel compares to each of the other 28 countries in the dataset on key indicators of interest. While it is impossible to discuss all dynamics of such a large amount of data in detail for each country, this section includes key cross-national findings to get a sense of how Israel compares to all of the countries in the data set, including a particular focus on the 18-30 year old age group. Note that not all figures and tables in the text include information on statistical significance in order to ease readability of the information. As is clear from the findings reported thus far, the dataset is sufficiently large that in general differences documented between countries are robust, and further documentation of statistical significance is easily accessible.

For ease of interpretability, the following figures use standard two-letter abbreviations for the country in the dataset, listed as reference in the table below.

Table. Country Abbreviations

<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Country</i>
AL	Albania	IL	Israel
BE	Belgium	IS	Iceland
BG	Bulgaria	IT	Italy
CH	Switzerland	LT	Lithuania
CY	Cyprus	NL	Netherlands
CZ	Czech Republic	NO	Norway
DE	Germany	PL	Poland
DK	Denmark	PT	Portugal
EE	Estonia	RU	Russian Federation
ES	Spain	SE	Sweden
FI	Finland	SI	Slovenia
FR	France	SK	Slovakia
GB	United Kingdom	UA	Ukraine
HU	Hungary	XK	Kosovo
IE	Ireland		

Courts treat everyone the same by country: All ages, and 18-30 year old


The following page shows figures that document the highest ranked item in the 29-country sample, as well as the Israeli-only sample, namely that courts treat everyone the same. The y-axis is the mean value, and the whisker plot shows the confidence interval of the mean value for each country. The countries are ordered on the x-axis by the country abbreviation in alphabetical order (see prior table for abbreviations; Israel is "IL")

The first figure displays the findings for the whole dataset, including all age groups. The figure shows that Israel ranks higher than the 29-country mean on this measure, and is on par with countries like Belgium and Sweden.

The subsequent figure displays the findings for 18-30 year olds only, and also for this age group Israel is above the 29-country mean.


In sum, it is clear that Israelis of all ages agree with the European sentiment that it is highly important for democracy in general that courts are fair.

Figure. All age groups: Courts treat everyone the same by country



Notes: n=53,551. Mean for all age groups: 9.23, SE .014, confidence interval: 9.2 to 9.3

Figure. 18-30 year olds only: Courts treat everyone the same by country




Notes: n=9,592. Mean for 18-30 year olds: 9.12, SE .03, confidence interval: 9.1 to 9.2.

Government explains its decisions: All ages, and 18-30 year old

The following page shows figures that document an item for which Israelis score relatively low among all age groups, and particularly low among Israeli young adults, namely the importance of the government explaining its decisions.


The first figure shows that Israel is below the 29-country average, and is on par with countries like Portugal, as well as more developed democracies like Belgium. The next figure shows, however, that among 18-30 year olds only, Israel is among the lowest ranked countries in the whole dataset, on par with countries like Russia and Slovakia, and with only one country scoring a statistically significant lower mean (Czechoslovakia).

Figure. All age groups: Government explains its decisions



Notes: n=53,285. Mean for all age groups: 8.88, SE .015, confidence interval: 8.8 to 8.9

Figure. 18-30 year olds only: Government explains its decisions




Notes: n=9,547. Mean for 18-30 year olds: 8.71, SE .038, confidence interval: 8.6 to 8.8

Democratic ideals group sizes across countries; all ages vs. 18-30 year olds

The following set of figures displays the proportion of the population for each country that belongs to each of the five democratic ideals groups already discussed. The findings show proportions of each group for all 29 countries for all age groups, and also for the 18-30 age group only. The countries are ordered from smallest to largest proportion size for each democratic ideal group. Each figure is followed by a summary table that focuses on the data for Israel in comparison to the 29 country proportion, for all age groups as well as for the 18-30 year old group only.

Figure. "Low expectations" proportion by country




	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
29 countries	10%	11%
Israel	6.5%	12.5%

NOTE: Israel has relatively small proportion of population that belongs to the “low expectations” group, but this group is also disproportionately young compared to European average.

Democratic ideals group sizes across countries; all ages vs. 18-30 year olds (cont'd)


Figure. "Medium ideals" proportion by country



	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
29 countries	29%	34%
Israel	36%	39%

Democratic ideals group sizes across countries; all ages vs. 18-30 year olds (cont'd)


Figure. "High expectations" proportion by country



	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
29 countries	23%	20%
Israel	22%	16%

Democratic ideals group sizes across countries; all ages vs. 18-30 year olds (cont'd)

Figure. "Political rights" proportion by country




	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
29 countries	16%	16%
Israel	16%	16%

Democratic ideals group sizes across countries; all ages vs. 18-30 year olds (cont'd)

Figure. "Social rights" proportion by country

All ages

18-30yo only



	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
29 countries	22%	19%
Israel	20%	17%

Summary figures, age by democratic ideals group


NOTE: includes separate categorization of 18-21 year old group

Age distribution: 29 country & Israel


Categ	Age	29 country			Israel		
		Freq.	Percent	Cum.	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	15-17	1,720	3.15	3.15	131	5.22	5.22
2	18-21	2,845	5.2	8.35	185	7.38	12.6
3	22-30	6,930	12.68	21.03	430	17.15	29.74
4	31-45	13,214	24.17	45.19	604	24.08	53.83
5	46-65	18,555	33.94	79.13	722	28.79	82.62
6	66-103	11,276	20.62	99.76	418	16.67	99.28
.	.	133	0.24	100	18	0.72	100
Total		54,673	100		2,508	100	

Bar chart note: y-axis is average age category of the group member (left column above)

For 29-country data, the “low” group average (4.36) indicates that the average age of those in the “low democratic ideals group is higher than the 31-45 age group (see categories in previous table in the left-hand column), and is similar to the age range of other democratic ideals groups.




For Israel data, the “low” group average (3.66) means that average age of those in the “low” democratic ideals are younger than the other groups in Israel, and those with “high” expectations are older




Democratic ideals by gender

For the 29 country data, gender is fairly balanced across the different democratic ideals groups – both for the all-age dataset, as well as the 18-30 year old group only. For Israel, the main gender distinction is that the “low” democratic ideals group has a high proportion of men (and low proportion of women). This gender distinction in Israel holds for all age groups, and the over-representation of men in the “low ideals” group is even more striking for the young age group of 18-30 year olds.


All ages, 29 countries (n=51,709)




18-30 year olds, 29 countries (n=9286)



Democratic ideals by gender (continued)
Israel, all ages (n=2350)



Israel, 18-30 year olds (n=579)
Note, for "low" group n=67



Democratic ideals by religion / ethnicity

The ESS 2012 survey aims to interview citizens only, and there is no single question that directly asks respondents whether they identify as Israeli Jews versus an Arab-Israeli or Palestinian-Israeli citizen of Israel. A series of questions approximate different aspects of these identities, including:

- **Discrimination:** whether you identify as a member of a discriminated group (in Israel, 16.75% of respondents). Some discriminated individuals may not be Arab/Palestinian and vice versa
- **Ethnic minority:** (11.84% of respondents). Some ethnic minorities may not be Arab/Palestinians; though presumably most of the Arab/Palestinians would self-identify as ethnic minority, which raises the question as to why the affirmative response is relatively low on this measure.
- **Arab language spoken at home as a first language (15.03%).** Some who identify as Arab/Palestinians may not speak Arabic as a first language at home (the survey also asks about second language). Alternatively, some who speak Arabic at home may not be Arab/Palestinians (i.e. Jewish immigrants from Arab countries), though crosstabs of Jewish identity and Arab language spoken at home as a first language show that only 12 respondents in the data fit this description out of the 2,087 Jewish identifiers (.006 of the Jewish population).

To obtain initial findings on distinction between Jews and the Arab/Palestinian minority in Israel this findings report includes analyses that take advantage of a question about religion that include categories for "Jewish" and "Muslim" among the response options.

Religion:

“Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?”

29-country

	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Yes	33,719	62.17	62.17
No	20,514	37.83	100
Total	54,233	100	

Israel

	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Yes	2,484	99.04	99.04
No	24	0.96	100
Total	2,508	100	

NOTE: not see Hebrew question wording below; Hebrew translation can be interpreted to include ethnicity, unlike English wording. Large difference in means and very high mean value for Israel indicate this is a problematic variable for cross-national comparison.

האם אתה רואה את עצמך כמי שמשתייך לדת או עדה דתית מסוימת?

Democratic ideals by religion / ethnicity (cont'd)

Israel: If yes, what religion or denomination do you belong to at present?

	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Roman Catholic	46	1.85	1.85
Protestant	3	0.12	1.97
Eastern Orthodox	28	1.13	3.1
Other Christian denomination	13	0.52	3.62
Jewish	2,087	84.05	87.68
Other non-Christian religions	4	0.16	87.84
Sunni	251	10.11	97.95
Druze	48	1.93	99.88
Other Islam denominations	3	0.12	100
Total	2,483	100	


Religion variable recoded, all data recoded to 3 main religions groups

	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Jewish	2,087	84.19	84.19
Muslim	302	12.18	96.37
Christian	90	3.63	100
Total	2,479	100	


Religion variable recoded to omit Christians for simpler Jewish-Muslim comparisons

	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Jewish	2,087	87.36	87.36
Muslim	302	12.64	100
Total	2,389	100	

Israel, democratic ideals for all age groups (Muslims = 12.6% of total population)



Israel, democratic ideals for 18-30 year olds only (Muslims = 25% of this age group)





Policy statement: re: income inequality

Summary: for figures on this page (all ages) and next (18-30 year olds only), Israelis clearly have stronger levels of agreement that the government should reduce income level differences when compared to the 29-country data.

AGE: all ages



"Government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels"



Policy statement: re: income inequality (cont'd)

AGE: 18-30 year olds only

*"Government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels"



3. Findings section II: Political participation

The following table shows Israel-specific descriptive statistics cross-national comparisons for the 8 indicators of political participation included in the ESS 2012 survey.

Description	Abbreviation	All ages			18-30 year olds only			
		28 ESS cntry	Israel mean	Israel order	28 ESS cntry	18-30 yo order	Israel mean	Israel order
1. Voted in last national elections	vote	0.69	0.65	1	0.52	1	0.44	1
2. Signed a petition	sgnptit	0.20	0.12	3	0.18	2	0.12	4
3. Boycotted certain products	bctprd	0.15	0.20	2	0.12	3	0.14	2
4. Worked in another org. or association	wrkorg	0.13	0.03	7	0.10	4	0.04	6
5. Contacted a politician, govt. or local official	contplt	0.11	0.10	5	0.06	7	0.09	5
6. Taken part in a lawful public demonstration	pblmnn	0.08	0.11	4	0.10	5	0.12	3
7. Work or displayed a campaign badge/sticker	badge	0.07	0.03	6	0.08	6	0.04	7
8. Worked in a political party or action group	wrkprty	0.04	0.02	8	0.03	8	0.03	8
n		51048	2414		8945		597	

These indicators can be analyzed to identify whether there are certain types of participation that can be considered as belonging to the same latent factor or concept. The following table shows that two main types of participation can be identified:

- Institutionalized participation (Factor 1), which includes contacting a politician or official; working in a political party or group; and working in another organization or association.
- Non-institutionalized participation (Factor 2), which includes signing a petition, boycotting certain produced, and taking part in a lawful demonstration.

Table. Political participation acts, dimensionality – 29 countries

Political act	Mean	Factor 1 Institutionalized	Factor 2 Non-institutionalized
Contacted a politician, government or local official	0.111	0.787	0
Worked in a political party or action group	0.039	0.672	0.126
Worked in another organization or association	0.130	0.54	0.335
Signed a petition	0.199	0.181	0.745
Boycotted certain products	0.154	-0.025	0.756
Taken part in a lawful public demonstration	0.082	0.219	0.537
Work or displayed a campaign badge/sticker	0.067	0.493	0.377

Source: European Social Survey 2012 (n=53,462). Factor analysis results based on exploratory principle components factor analysis with a varimax rotation. Substantively similar results obtain with a promax rotation. Eigenvalues for the rotated factors are 1.687 for Factor 1, and 1.684 for Factor 2. Appropriate weights applied in ESS6 version 2.2: population size weights and post-stratification weights (pspwght*weight).

The participation indicators reviewed above are therefore analyzed below in terms of three different measures of political participation, summarized below. See Oser & Hooghe (2016b) for further documentation and discussion of these measures.

Political participation (DV)

- (1) Overall participation (7 indicators; below plus badge/sticker)
- (2) Electoral-oriented, “institutionalized”
- (3) Beyond the electoral arena “non-institutionalized”

Electoral-oriented “Institutionalized”	Beyond the electoral arena “Non-institutionalized”
Contacted a political or government official	Signed a petition
Worked in a political party or action group	Boycotted products
Worked in another org. or association	Lawful demonstration


20

Participation means across countries; all ages vs. 18-30 year olds


The following series of figures displays a cross-country comparison of participation means for all age groups, and also for 18-30 year olds only.

Vote

All Ages



18-30yo only




	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
29 countries	0.69	0.51
Israel	0.65	0.44


Participation means across countries; all ages vs. 18-30 year olds (cont'd)

All participation except for vote (partic2) – dichotomous yes or no

All Ages



18-30yo only




	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
29 countries	0.38	0.35
Israel	0.34	0.30


Participation means across countries; all ages vs. 18-30 year olds (cont'd)

Conventional (conven2) – dichotomous yes or no

All Ages




18-30yo only



	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
29 countries	0.22	0.17
Israel	0.12	0.11

Participation means across countries; all ages vs. 18-30 year olds (cont'd)

Unconventional participation, all ages



	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
29 countries	0.29	0.29
Israel	0.28	0.25

Political Participation by gender

Few distinctions between men and women are evident in participation patterns in general, which is consistent with recent literature on this topic (e.g. Oser et al 2013). When there is a distinction, it tends to somewhat favor increased male participation, both in all-country data set, and in Israel-specific data. The one type of participation for which women participate somewhat more than men is for unconventional participation in Israel among 18-30 year olds, but this is not a statistically significant difference (One-way anova Scheffe test, $prob > F$ 0.408)

Vote

	29 countries		Israel	
	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
Male	0.71	0.53	0.69	0.48
Female	0.70	0.51	0.70	0.44
TOTAL	0.70	0.52	0.70	0.46

All participation except vote (partic2)

	29 countries		Israel	
	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
Male	0.41	0.38	0.35	0.31
Female	0.36	0.34	0.37	0.32
TOTAL	0.38	0.36	0.36	0.32

Conventional (conven2)

	29 countries		Israel	
	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
Male	0.25	0.19	0.15	0.13
Female	0.19	0.15	0.11	0.10
TOTAL	0.22	0.17	0.13	0.12

Unconventional (uncon2)

	29 countries		Israel	
	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
Male	0.30	0.31	0.28	0.26
Female	0.28	0.28	0.33	0.29
TOTAL	0.29	0.29	0.31	0.27

Political Participation in Israel by Jewish – Muslim

As many studies have shown (e.g. Shamir 2015), voting rates are higher for Jews than for Muslims in Israel. Similarly, an additive measure of participation in the ESS 2012 survey that includes all participation except voting shows a large participation gap with Jews participating at higher levels than Muslims, regardless of age breakdown.

Vote

	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
Jewish	0.74	0.51
Muslim	0.48	0.31
TOTAL	0.71	0.46

All participation except vote (partic2)

	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
Jewish	0.40	0.39
Muslim	0.15	0.12
TOTAL	0.37	0.32

A surprising finding, however, is that Jews and Muslims have similar levels of conventional participation, and this observation is expanded upon in the concluding discussion. For all ages, the Jewish-Muslim conventional gap is not statistically significant; for the 18-30 year old group only, there is a gap favoring Jewish participation that is marginally statistically significant (One-way anova Scheffe test, $\text{prob} > F 0.0577$).

Conventional (conven2)

	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
Jewish	0.13	0.14
Muslim	0.12	0.08
TOTAL	0.13	0.12

Unconventional (uncon2)

	All ages (15-103)	18-30 only
Jewish	0.35	0.35
Muslim	0.06	0.06
TOTAL	0.32	0.28

4. Findings section III: Relationship between ideals and participation

The findings in this section focus on the 29-country data as a whole, and further analyses have shown that findings for Israel only yield similar results on all key measures. For further description of the theoretical issues summarized in this section see Oser & Hooghe (2016b). Note that the analyses in Oser & Hooghe (2016b) include standard controls for the key socio-economic status indicators of education and income, and the Israeli data has similar patterns as other countries in that the more educated and the economically advantaged have more engaged democratic values and are more politically active.

Research Question

A focus of main theories (“grievance”, “critical citizens”):
citizens’ (dis)satisfaction with democracy → participation?

A lacuna:

Do citizens have similar conceptions of ideal democracy?



How do citizens’ conceptions of ideal democracy affect their political participation?

Why should we care?

Economic downturn and **austerity measures** in Europe since 2008



Concerns for **democratic legitimacy** in contemporary democracies



Do citizens with a **social rights vision** of democracy raise their voice in **political activity**, either institutionalized or non-institutionalized?

Social rights democratic vision → political action?



April 2014 protest in Spain against Austerity measures



Summer 2011 social protests in Israel




Table. Participation levels of democratic ideals groups – 29 countries

	<i>Overall participation</i>		<i>Institutionalized participation</i>		<i>Non-institutionalized participation</i>	
	Mean	S.D	Mean	S.D	Mean	S.D
Political rights group	0.534	0.499	0.316	0.465	0.427	0.495
Social rights group	0.386	0.487	0.206	0.405	0.300	0.458
High ideals group	0.385	0.487	0.216	0.412	0.303	0.458
Medium ideals group	0.378	0.485	0.217	0.412	0.276	0.447
Low ideals group	0.227	0.419	0.133	0.339	0.151	0.358
All respondents	0.380	0.485	0.216	0.411	0.289	0.454

Source: ESS 2012 (n=54,520).

For statistical analyses that control for national-level characteristics (i.e. multilevel logistic regression analyses, the following controls are used:

Controls

Individual-level:

- Age, sex, education, household income feeling

Country-level

- Established Democracy (Polity IV)
- Inequality (Gini)
- Good Governance Index (World Bank)
- GDP per capita

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Democratic ideals and political participation

Multilevel logit regression results

All 5 democratic ideals	Political Participation – 3 analyses		
Democratic Ideals (ref: “Medium”)	All	Institutionalized	Non-institution.
Social rights	Positive	None (N.S.)	Positive
Political rights	Positive (LARGE)	Positive (LARGE)	Positive (LARGE)

Only social and political	Political Participation		
Democratic Ideals (ref: “Social”)	All	Institutionalized	Non-institution.
Political rights	Positive (LARGE)	Positive (LARGE)	Positive (LARGE)

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Conclusion: 29 country study

- **Ideals:** Citizens hold distinctive democratic ideals – including T.H. Marshall’s **social rights** and **political rights** ideals.

- **Political participation, compared to “medium” reference:** **Social** and **political** groups are more politically active overall compared to “medium” reference group. But:
 - ❖ For the **social** group, the greater overall political activity is due to non-institutionalized activity (not electoral-oriented).
 - ❖ The **political** group is more active than the **social** group on all measures

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Additional Israel-specific variables that could be investigated in for future analyses

*"How religious would you say you are?"

	Fre	Percent	Cum.
not at all	459	18.3	18.3
1	96	3.83	22.13
2	116	4.63	26.75
3	131	5.22	31.98
4	132	5.26	37.24
5	332	13.24	50.48
6	224	8.93	59.41
7	286	11.4	70.81
8	326	13	83.81
9	120	4.78	88.6
very	263	10.49	99.08
.b	23	0.92	100

*"About how often do you attend religious services nowadays" (apart from special occasions, weddings, funerals)

	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Every day	198	7.89	7.89
More than once a week	80	3.19	11.08
Once a week	261	10.41	21.49
At least once a month	230	9.17	30.66
Only on special holy days	596	23.76	54.43
Less often	283	11.28	65.71
Never	836	33.33	99.04
.b	24	0.96	100
Total	2,508	100	

*Additional Israel-specific variables that could be investigated in for future analyses
(cont'd)*

"Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?"

	Freq	Percent	Cum
Yes	420	16.75	16.75
No	2,069	82.5	99.24
.b	19	0.76	100
Total	2,508	100	

*On what grounds is your group discriminated against?

Color or race	4.6%
Nationality	6.6%
Religion	9.2%
Language	6.0%
Ethnic group	5.6%
Age	2.5%
Gender	3.6%
Sexuality	1.3%
Disability	1.5%
Other grounds	3.7%

*Additive index of discrimination:

Summary: Of the 16.75% who reported being a member of a group that is discriminated against, only 1 of the grounds reported in the previous table as a cause is reported for 9.45%

Additive index	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	2,088	83.25	83.25
1	237	9.45	92.7
2	38	1.52	94.22
3	22	0.88	95.1
4	25	1	96.09
5	29	1.16	97.25
6	31	1.24	98.48
7	15	0.6	99.08
8	7	0.28	99.36
9	16	0.64	100

*Additional Israel-specific variables that could be investigated in for future analyses
(cont'd)*

*Are you an Israeli citizen?

Only 0.60% responded "no"; the ESS specifically targets citizens for their sample group.

*Migration and language: A series of questions [starting C18] ask about place of birth, year of immigration to Israel, languages spoken most often at home, and country of parents' birth.

*Minority ethnic group? Only 12% responded "yes".

Additional cross-national variables that aren't in regression analyses in Oser & Hooghe (2016b) but could be tested in future analyses:

*Trust questions: B2-8, How much do you personally trust the following institutions:

- Parliament
- Legal system
- Police
- Politicians
- Political parties

Coded data includes an additive index (Ptrust5_nat) used in Hooghe, Marien & Oser (2016)

*Your place in society – do you place yourself at the top or bottom? 0-10 (plinsoc)

Additional Israel-specific variables that could be analyzed in future work:

*B10 IL: If you voted in the last national election, which party did you vote for?

*B18a "Is there a particular party you feel closer to than all the other parties?"

*B 18 bIL [If yes to B18a] Which one?

*F 15 IL1 - Israel-specific education var

*F 15 IL2 - Russian-schooling Israel-specific education var

*Parental ed, Israel-specific – including father & mother, standard & Russian version

5. Findings summary and future research

Findings summary: democratic ideals

In comparison to the other 28 countries surveyed in the ESS 2012, Israel scores higher on 2 social rights items ("protecting citizens from poverty" and "reducing income inequality") and lower on 2 political rights items ("government explains its decisions" and "parties held accountable"). While this findings report focuses attention on ways in which Israel differs from other countries in the sample, it is also important to note the general similarity between Israel and the 28-country sample. Some items in this battery of questions on democratic ideals might be expected to differ given the broader Israeli political context, such as the importance of the rule of law, or the importance of the protection of minority rights. For these items and all others, however, the Israeli findings do not strongly deviate from the rest of the data, thereby cautioning researchers who may be tempted to remove Israel from the cross-national analytical sample.

For the 18-30 year old age group as well, the findings show general similarity between Israel and the other countries in the study, though two unique aspects of the Israeli findings are worthy of note. First, for the mean values of all of the democratic items, the Israeli young adults have particularly low scores for two items pertaining to political rights, namely the importance of holding governing parties accountable, and of the government explaining its decisions. Further research would be needed to determine why young adults in Israel rate these particular items so low. One plausible explanation could be the high priority Israelis attribute to the autonomy of political actors in making security-related political decisions. Another plausible explanation is that young adults in Israel do not see the governing institutions as relevant and open to accountability when they attempt to imagine what is most important for democracy.

A second important distinction between Israel and the 28-country sample pertains to the "low expectations" group, which is relatively small in Israel (6% of the total population) in comparison to the whole sample (10%). Within Israel, however, this low expectations group is disproportionately large among the 18-30 year olds (12%) a proportion that is more than twice as large as the next closest age group. In addition, in Israel the low expectations group is disproportionately male and Muslim. The full 29-country sample does not show the same pattern of high concentration of the 18-30 year old age group in the "low" expectations group, as the proportion of 18-30 year olds that are in the "low" group in the 29-country sample are similar to the sample that includes all age groups.

These findings highlight the importance of efforts to advance active citizenship among young adults in Israel in general, and particularly highlight the importance of considering programs, initiatives and organizational interventions that can support men and Muslim young adults to advance from the "low expectations" group of Israeli democracy.

Findings summary: Political participation

In terms of political participation patterns, the findings show that Israel is relatively low in institutionalized, electoral-oriented participation, especially among young adults. For non-institutionalized participation that takes place beyond the electoral arena, however Israel is close to the average of the whole sample. The findings show general parity in participation patterns between men and women, which is consistent with recent findings in the literature.

In the analysis of differences between Jews and Muslims in political participation patterns, a surprising finding, however, is that Jews and Muslims have similar levels of institutionalized participation (as noted, “institutionalized participation” is defined as an additive index of contacting a political, government or local official; working in a political party or action group; working in another organization or association).

This finding about the relative parity of Jews and Muslims in conventional participation is encouraging for those concerned about the political and democratic disengagement of the Arab / Palestinian minority in Israel. It seems plausible that the relative engagement of Muslims in conventional participation may be due to levels of involvement at the local authority level of government, and may also reflect comparatively high levels of Muslim citizen involvement in political parties in comparison to their Jewish counterparts.

A final noteworthy observation in the comparison of Jewish and Muslim citizens in Israel is that Muslims are relatively disengaged from unconventional political activity (as noted, “unconventional participation” is defined as an additive index of signing a petition, boycotting certain products, and taking part in a lawful public demonstration). There is no reason to doubt the veracity of these measures from the ESS 2012 survey, given the intensive efforts made to oversample the Arab citizens in Israel, and to use time-tested methods for effectively surveying Arab respondents, though it is certainly possible that “social desirability” bias may lead Arab citizens to underreport their activities (e.g., Karp & Brockington 2005; Shamir & Shamir 1995). According to the ESS data, however, there is no indication that the low levels of democratic ideals and expectations among Arabs reported in Section I are associated with high levels of unconventional protest and political activity. Rather, these descriptive statistics paint more of a picture of a relatively low-expectation population with respect to democratic ideals that is not subsequently channeling their disappointment or frustration into unconventional political activities of any kind.

Future research

The findings report highlights the importance of several next-step analyses that could be conducted to gain a better understanding of the findings in this report, including:

- Is Israel more similar to Eastern, Western, or Southern Europe? Further analyses could be conducted to clarify this question regarding democratic values and political behavior.
- Policy statement regarding income inequality: young adults in Israel in the ESS data report a high interest in the government creating policies to address income inequality. ESS data could be further analyzed to better understand the public opinion environment around the time of the summer 2011 protests. This research could be conducted in conjunction with original archival data on the protest leaders' planning process (accessible to Aya Shoshan, doctoral candidate at BGU).
- Over-time ESS data on political participation: while the battery of questions on democratic ideals analyzed in this report were asked for the first time in 2012, the questions on political participation are consistently asked in the ESS survey, and further research could be conducted on available data between 2002 and 2014 to understand over-time trends in Israel with a focus on young adults.

In addition to these ideas that immediately follow upon the ESS 2012 analysis, this findings report highlights a number of research projects that can be pursued to deepen our understanding of the democratic values and political participation in Israel. These research projects are at various stages of development, and further information can be provided upon request.

- The relationship between citizenship norms, digital media use and political participation in Israel: an ISF-funded project for 2016-2020 led by Oser as the Principal Investigator.
- Comparing Israel with other contemporary democracies on these dynamics of citizenship norms, digital media use and political participation. A proposal to the German-Israeli Foundation is currently under review with the Principal Investigators of Oser and Prof. Jan van Deth of Mannheim University, and the Collaborating Investigator of Yannis Theocharis (expected grant outcome report: July 2017).
- Analyzing Israeli conceptions of citizenship in comparison to other democracies: A new dataset became available in August 2016 (the International Social Survey Program) that surveyed over 30 countries on a wide variety of topics related to citizenship. The survey conducted by the ISSP in 2004 was the first time this module was conducted, and the recently available data is from a survey conducted in 2014. Israel is one of the countries in this data, so analyses could be conducted to compare Israel with over 30 countries in 2004 and 2014.
- Developing engaged citizens, leaders and activists in Israel: This project is in the early stages of development, in consultation with Hahrie Han (2016), following her recent groundbreaking work using field experiments to investigate how organizations can create environments in which civic leaders and activists are developed in the United States

Concluding comment for practitioners

For practitioners aiming to advance active citizenship in Israel, the findings summarized in this report raise concerns about the democratic ideals and participation of young adults at the same time that they emphasize the opportunity for interventions by organizations like those funded by the Gandy Foundation. The Israeli population as a whole is not democratically disengaged in their democratic values or political behavior, as demonstrated in this findings report. It is clear, however, that the young adults in Israel, display some degree of normative and behavioral disengagement that can serve as a cause for concern for some, as well as an opportunity for engagement and intervention for others.

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